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Ronald J. Gilson
UNOCAL FIFTEEN YEARS LATER
(and what we can do about it)
Ronald J. Gilson*
June, 2000
A natural inclination to stocktaking accompanies the new millennium.  Its
coincidence with the fifteenth anniversary of the Delaware Supreme Court’s
announcement in Unocal1of a new approach to takeover law provides an appropriate
occasion to step back and evaluate a remarkable experiment in corporate law – the
Delaware Supreme Court’s development of an intermediate standard for evaluating
defensive tactics.
 This experiment began with, and was surely a response to, an earlier and
extremely controversial takeover wave.  But these transactions were remarkable for more
than just their scope, goal, and method.  They also were remarkable as a social
phenomenon, the studied indifference to which by sociologists remains a remarkable
disciplinary failure.  The emergence of junk bond financing – I prefer the period term
                                                 
* Charles J. Meyers Professor of Law and Business, Stanford University, and Marc and Eva Stern Professor
of Law and Business, Columbia University.  An earlier version of this essay was presented as the 1999
Pelleggi Lecture at Widener Law School, and I have tried to retain the tone of that format, albeit adorned
with footnotes.  Since delivering the Pellegi Lecture I have had the benefit of collaboration with Alan
Schwartz on a development of the views expressed in more preliminary form in my lecture.  As will be
obvious to those who both attended the lecture and read this article, the quality of the current effort plainly
reflects Professor Schwartz’s participation.  I am grateful to the Widener Law School and the Wilmington
bar for the hospitality I was offered during my visit.  I am also grateful to Rob Daines, Jeffrey Gordon and
Michael Klausner for their helpful comments on an earlier draft, and to Win Hwangbo for excellent
research assistance.
1 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
2“junk bond” to the more dignified label of  “high yield” because the difference in the
terms capture the distance in attitude that we’ve covered in the last 15 years – opened the
market for corporate control to a range of acquirers who were hardly members of the
corporate establishment.  I was a reporter for the ALI Corporate Governance Project2 and
had special responsibility for the part of the project dealing with transactions in control.
As I sat in what seemed an endless series of meetings, only part of the debate was about
the right legal rules; the remainder, sotto voce, was over who – the new raiders or the ALI
members’ clients – were going to control some of the most significant actors in our
economy.
Finally, and here we return to the realm of law from that of economics and
sociology, the Delaware courts ultimately placed themselves at the center of the
maelstrom.  As de Touqeville noted about the United States some 175 years ago, lawyers
are at the core of our economic and political life.3  And in the 1980s the Delaware courts
were squarely in the middle of the largest and most contentious business transactions in
history.
We now have sufficient perspective, both on that takeover wave and on the
Delaware courts’ response, to reassess both the motivation and the efficacy of this effort
at modernizing corporate law to cope with the emergence of hostile tender offers, a
phenomenon which, both technically and conceptually, then existing corporate law was
inadequate to address.  While acknowledging the difficult circumstances in which the
Delaware Supreme Court found itself in 1985, I will argue that Unocal ultimately has
developed into an unexplained and, I think, inexplicable preference that control contests
                                                 
2 American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations (1994).
3be resolved through elections rather than market transactions.  In doing so, I will
highlight the remarkable struggle between the Chancery Court and the Supreme Court for
Unocal’s soul, a contest I will suggest the Supreme Court won only by fiat.  I will also
maintain that the current debate over shareholder-adopted bylaws that repeal or amend
director-adopted poison pill plans provides a vehicle to reposition Delaware takeover law
for a new millennium.  In the end, takeovers are just an equilibrating mechanism that is
triggered by changes in the real economic environment.4  It is a noncontroversial
prediction that the pace of change will continue to accelerate, and that transactional
responses will continue to pressure corporate law.  Delaware law’s current pro-election,
anti-market bias is not suited to meeting that challenge.
Finally, I will end my retrospective on a note of praise.  Intertwined with the
development of Delaware takeover jurisprudence is a reassessment and important
expansion of the role of independent directors in corporate governance.  There is no
reason why this important development cannot be preserved if the Delaware Supreme
Court chooses to otherwise restore balance to the law of takeovers.
A word about style before going forward with substance.  The audience to which I
address this essay needs no lengthy account of the last fifteen years of Delaware case law.
For the judiciary and corporate bar, the takeover cases that stretch from 1985 to 2000
have dictated the path of their professional lives; they need no detailed itinerary from me
                                                                                                                                                  
3 I Alexis deTouqueville, Democracy in America 272-80 (Bradley  ed. 1987)(“Scarcely any political
question arises in the United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question.”).
4 For discussion of the equilibrating function of takeovers, see Ronald J. Gilson, The Political Ecology of
Takeovers: Thoughts on Harmonizing The European Corporate Governance Environment, 61 Ford. L. Rev.
161 (1992).
4to recall the journey.  Thus, my argument is made at the edge, taking most of the trail for
granted and focusing only on junctions that I believe were especially important.5
I.  Setting the Stage
Over the last fifteen years the Delaware courts have been at the center of a
process that was far larger than the law.  Starting in the 1970s and accelerating through
the 1980s, the United States has undergone one of the most remarkable industrial
restructurings in our history.  The organizational calm of the early 1970s was shattered by
an unprecedented wave of hostile takeovers whose goal was quite explicit: to reshape the
structure of American industry.  Whether by dissipating the excess cash flow that oil
companies were diverting to a bizarre range of diversification,6 or by breaking up the
1960s’ conglomerates,7 these transactions drove an industrial stampede back to focus – a
strategy based on specialization in industries whose demands fit a company’s experience
and skills.8
At the time, however, the industrial logic of the new takeover phenomenon was
much less clear.  The combination of the rate of change and the vehicle of change –
hostile takeovers launched by a new class of entrepreneurs who until the application of
junk bond financing to acquisitions had no access to the business arena in which their
targets contended – generated an extreme reaction.  Many prominent commentators,
                                                 
5 For those who are interested in a more detailed description, see Ronald J. Gilson & Bernard Black, The
Law and Finance of Corporate Acquisitions 801-95 (2d Ed. 1995), and the 1999 Supplement  72-97.
6 See, e.g., Michael Jensen, The Takeover Controversy: Analysis and Evidence, in Knights, Raiders and
Targets 314, 329-37 (J. Coffee, L. Lowenstein & S. Rose-Ackerman, eds., 1988).
7 See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, The Takeover Wave of the 1980s, 249 Sci, 745 (1990); Sanjai
Bhagat, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Hostile Takeovers in the 1980s: The Return to Corporate
Specialization, in Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Microeconomics 1 (1990).
8 Robert Comment & Gregg Jarrell, Corporate Focus and Stock Returns (Bradley Policy Res. Center, Univ.
of Rochester, WPMR 91-01, 1991).
5some – like Martin Lipton9 – with a stake in resisting the takeover movement, and others
– like Peter Drucker10 – who had no ax to grind, thought junk bond-financed, bust-up
takeovers a threat to the very Republic.  The Chairman of Deutsche Bank was rather
more direct.  In a hyperbole the extent of whose overstatement has been made clear by
recent events in Russia, characterized the takeover wave simply as “gangster capitalism.”
The Delaware courts had little choice but to intercede in this controversy.
Only three institutions were in a position to act effectively in response to this good faith
but overheated debate, but two were unlikely candidates.  Congress seemed to have
exhausted its energy a decade before with the Williams Act.  And the Securities
Exchange Commission increasingly voiced a decidedly pro-takeover position.11  If there
was to be a balanced assessment, which given the shrillness of the debate must have
seemed attractive if only for its softer tone, it would have to come from Delaware.
Unfortunately, Delaware law was not then up to the task. As I have described the
phenomenon elsewhere, the hostile takeover wave of the 1980s subjected the traditional
structure of corporate law to the equivalent of a stress test.  Driven by one of “the most
significant corporate restructuring in history, serious doctrinal cracks appeared, the most
important of which concerned allocating final decision rights in the face of a hostile
tender offer.”12  Corporate law provided two general standards of review of management
conduct: the business judgment rule which applied to claims that management violated its
duty of care; and the intrinsic fairness test which applied to claims that management
                                                 
9 Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom, 35 Bus. Law. 101 (1979).
10 Taming the Corporate Takeover, Wall St,J,, Oct. 30, 1984, at 30, col.3 (“[A] good many experienced
business leaders I know hold takeover fear to be a main cause of the decline in America’s competitive
strength in the world economy … [i]t contributes to the obsession with the short term.”
11 For example, the SEC filed an amicus brief in Moran v. Household International, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346
(Del. 1985), asserting the invalidity of the poison pill under Delaware law.
12 Ronald J. Gilson, The Fine Art of Judging: William T. Allen, 22 Del. J.Corp.L 914, 914 (1997).
6violated its duty of loyalty.  Hostile takeovers drove in a wedge at their point of tangency,
leaving a yawning doctrinal chasm.  On the one hand, evaluating the desirability of a
target’s acquisition is the quintessential business judgment.  On the other hand, target
management faces an inherent conflict of interest in confronting a transaction that
directly threatens both their positions and their egos.  Deploying defensive tactics thus
resembles an interested transaction that calls for review under the rigorous entire fairness
standard.  As a matter of corporate law, existing doctrine left wide open the critical
functional question: who should make the decision concerning the outcome of a hostile
takeover bid?13  As a matter of public policy, the resolution of this question would
significantly influence who would govern the largest and most powerful private
institutions in our society.
Two contending interest groups advanced quite different answers with equal
vigor.  Takeover defense lawyers argued that board decisions with respect to tender offers
should be treated like board decisions concerning any other acquisition proposal: the
business judgment rule should operate to allocate the primary decision-making role to
management.14  Academics took a very different view, seeing tender offers as an
important corporate governance device in their own right, and therefore urged that the
shareholders be allocated the final decision-making role.  In this view, the market for
corporate control served to displace inefficient managers both directly through a
particular transaction, and indirectly through the general deterrence resulting from the
                                                 
13 For a contemporaneous framing of the issue see Ronald J. Gilson: A Structural  Approach to
Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Takeovers, 33 Stan. L.Rev. 819, 845-48 (1981).
14 Martin Lipton advanced this position most effectively.  Lipton, supra note 9.
7threat of a takeover.  Efficient operation of the market for corporate control necessitated
that shareholders make the ultimate decision concerning the success of a hostile bid.15
Interestingly, the pro-management takeover defense lawyers and the pro-
shareholder academics implicitly agreed on an important common premise: courts should
not determine the outcome of the largest business transactions in history.  Figure One
illustrates the position of the contending groups on the identity of the proper takeover
decision maker.
Figure One: Who Should Decide the Outcome of a Hostile Bid?
Interest Group Preferred Decision Maker
Defense Lawyers Independent Directors
No One Courts
Academics Shareholders
In Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court chose the middle ground that had been
championed by no one.  The court unveiled an intermediate standard of review,
somewhere between the duty of care and the duty of loyalty.  What was especially
notable about what came to be called the proportionality test – did the hostile offer
present a threat and, if so, was the target’s response proportional16 – was the role of the
court itself.  In assessing the balance between threat and response, the court cast itself as
an arbitrator of the substantive merit of target company behavior.  As Unocal was
                                                 
15 See, e.g., Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in
Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1161 (1981); Gilson, A Structural Approach, supra note13.
16See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Intermediate Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is
There Substance to Proportionality Review, 44 Bus. Law. 247 (1989 ).
8originally framed, the court functions, in effect, as a regulatory agency, deciding for itself
between good defensive tactics – those reasonable in relation to the threat – and bad
defensive tactics, those that go beyond what the bid requires.  Unusually for Delaware
law, Unocal committed the court, in appropriate circumstances, to substitute its judgment
for that of the board.  And lest anyone doubt that the court had set itself up to regulate
defensive conduct, the decision in Household International,17 coming directly on the
heels of Unocal, made matters absolutely clear.  Despite the Supreme Court’s quite
activist stance in approving a board of directors’ adoption of a poison pill without
shareholder approval, it reserved to itself an intermediate level of review of a board’s
decision not to redeem the pill after an offer actually was made.  The court – and plainly
not the board in the exercise of its business judgment – would decide whether declining
to pull the pill was a proportionate response.
II. The Chancery Court’s Development of Unocal: Allocating Decision Making
Roles Between Shareholders and Directors
At this point, the Supreme Court largely retired from the field, leaving the Court
of Chancery to work out the profile of the new regulatory role implicit in the
proportionality test.  In deference to the traditional Delaware respect for the business
judgment rule and the limited judicial role the business judgment role dictates, the
Chancery Court responded by recasting Unocal in terms of an allocation of decision-
making roles not between the board and the court, but between the board and the
shareholders.  And it was at this point in the drama that Reinier Kraakman and I wrote
our Business Lawyer article out of the fear, well-placed as it turned out, that despite the
bold words of Unocal  and Household International, the Delaware Supreme Court could
                                                 
17 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985)
9not sustain the regulatory function of directly assessing the merits of target company
defensive tactics.18
  Perhaps because it also doubted the Supreme Court’s resolve, the Chancery
Court in a series of cases highlighted by Anderson, Clayton,19 Interco,20 and Pillsbury,21
developed a thoughtful doctrinal framework that focused not on judicial assessment of
the wisdom of director decisions, but on allocating decision responsibility between
shareholders and directors.  In the face of a non-coercive hostile offer, directors could
respond to a belief that the price offered was too low – “substantive coercion” in today’s
inaccurate use of the term22 – by using a pill to secure the time to negotiate or seek a
better offer.  In the end, however, after time for negotiating and investigating alternatives,
the directors could not “just say no” by declining to pull the pill, and thereby blocking the
                                                 
18 Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 16.
19 A.C. Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103 (Del. 1986).
20 City Capital Associates v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del.Ch. 1988).
21 Grand Metropolitan PLC v. The Pillsbury Company, 558 A.2d 1049 (Del. 1988).
22 The term was coined in Gilson & Kraakman, supra n. 16, to refer to the claim by target management that
target shareholders might accept an offer which, despite reflecting a substantial premium over market price,
nonetheless understated the company intrinsic value.  While Gilson and Kraakman acknowledged the
concept, the article specified a detailed judicial inquiry into the factual basis for the belief; the simple
assertion of underpricing was insufficient to establish substantive coercion:
To support an allegation of substantive coercion, a meaningful proportionality test
 requires a coherent statement of management’s expectations about the future value
 of the company.  From the perspective of shareholders, substantive coercion is possible
 only if the management plausibly expects to better the terms of the hostile offer –
whether by bargaining with the offeror, by securing a competitive bid, or by managing
 the company better than the market expects.  To make such a claim requires more that
 the standard statement that a target’s board and its advisers believe the hostile offer
 to be “grossly inadequate.”  In particular, demonstrating the existence of a threat of
 substantive coercion requires a showing of how – and when – management expects
 a target’s shareholders to do better.
Id. at 268.  Unfortunately, only the phrase and not the substance captured the attention of the Delaware
Supreme Court; the mere incantation of substantive coercion now seems sufficient to establish a threat
under Unocal without any inquiry into the facts or management’s explanation for the market’s under
pricing of the company’s shares.  Much to Professor Kraakman’s and my relief, Vice Chancellor Strine
discusses the Delaware Supreme Court’s misuse of the concept of substantive coercion in Cheasapeake
Corporation v. Shore, Civ. Action 17626 (Feb. 7, 2000), slip opinion at 78-80.
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shareholders from rejecting the board’s strategy and accepting the hostile offer.
Chancellor Allen put the matter most clearly in Interco:
To acknowledge that directors may employ the recent
innovation of “poison pills” to deprive shareholders of
the ability effectively to accept a noncoercive offer,
after the board has had a reasonable opportunity to
explore or create alternatives or attempt to negotiate on
the shareholders’ behalf, would, it seems to me, be so
inconsistent with widely shared notions of corporate
governance as to threaten to diminish the legitimacy
and authority of our corporate law.23
 Chancellor Allen applied the same approach in Time-Warner, an opinion that
warrants careful attention despite its ill treatment by the Delaware Supreme Court on
appeal.  Perhaps anticipating that the Supreme Court, one way or another, would allow
Time to complete its acquisition of Warner regardless of shareholder preferences, the
Chancellor allowed Time to go forward with the acquisition.  Allen stressed, however,
that, “because of the timing involved, the board has no need here to rely upon a self-
created power designed to assure a veto on all changes in control.”24  And to eliminate
any possibility that the point might be misunderstood, Allen appended a footnote stating
that the outcome might well have been different if Time were relying on a poison pill – in
Allen’s words, “a control mechanism and not a devise with independent business
purposes….”25
In short, the Chancery Court opinion in Time-Warner, at least with respect to the
proportionality leg of Unocal, simply parallels Interco.  In Interco, management was
                                                 
23 551 A.2d at 800.
24 Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 1989 WL 79880 (Del.Ch. July 14, 1989), reprinted in 15
Del. J.Corp. L. 700 (1990).  Recall that Paramount could not close a tender offer for Time without securing
local government approvals of the transfer of cable television franchises, a timing problem that did not
impede Time’s offer for Warner.
25Id. at n.22.
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allowed to proceed with its sale of the Ethan Allen division even if the sale had the effect
of blocking the hostile offer, as in fact it did, but the pill ultimately had to be pulled to
allow shareholders to decide whether to accept the hostile offer.  In Time-Warner, Time
could proceed with its acquisition of Warner even if that had the effect of blocking
Paramount’s hostile offer; because Time did not rely on a pill, shareholders were free to
decide whether to accept a hostile offer for the combined companies should one be made.
As in Interco, managers pursued their business plan unchecked by the hostile takeover,
and shareholders decided whether to accept an offer, albeit one that ultimately was
withdrawn as in Interco or was never made as in Time-Warner.
And that brings us to the Supreme Court’s development of Unocal, which I will
argue has proven dramatically less successful than the approach taken by the Chancery
Court.  So that it will be clear where I am going with this, I have two points to make.
First, we lack any coherent explanation of why the Supreme Court rejected the Chancery
Court’s carefully crafted allocation of decision-making authority between shareholders
and management.  In particular, the Supreme Court opinion in Time-Warner seems
simply to have misunderstood the body of law the Chancery Court had created.  Second,
the Supreme Court’s effort to articulate the Unocal standard, most explicitly in Unitrin,26
collapses into an unexplained functional preference that changes of control should occur
through elections rather than courts.
III.  The Rejection of the Chancery Court’s Approach
In the debate between the Chancery Court and Supreme Court in Time-Warner,
the Supreme Court won only by fiat.  The Supreme Court’s response to the Chancery
Court’s Unocal jurisprudence came in a cryptic one-sentence reference.  Responding to
12
Paramount’s position that an all-cash, non-coercive offer was not a threat under Unocal,
the Supreme Court stated:
“To the extent that the Court of Chancery has recently [substituted its
judgment for what is a ‘better deal’ for that of a corporation’s board of
directors] in certain of its opinions, we hereby reject such approach as not
in keeping with a proper Unocal analysis.  See, e.g., Interco and its
progeny … .27
But Interco had nothing to do with substituting the court’s judgment for that of
the board.  To the extent that Interco is about substitution at all, it involved substituting
the shareholders’ – not the court’s – judgment for that of the directors’.  Interco makes
this point explicitly.  Allowing directors, the court stated, “to deprive shareholders of the
ability effectively  … to accept a noncoercive offer … would be so inconsistent with
widely shared notions of corporate governance as to … diminish the legitimacy … of our
corporate law.”28  The decision-making conflict here is between the board and the
shareholders; the court’s judgment about “what is a ‘better deal’” is beside the point, and
so, it follows, was the concern voiced by the Supreme Court in Time-Warner.
IV.  The Supreme Court Decision in Unitrin: The Preference for Elections over
Markets
 Time-Warner thus left us with the clear understanding that the Supreme Court
had rejected whatever it conceived the Chancery Court to have crafted, but without
giving us any sense of what it had in mind.  That began to take form in Unitrin, decided
some five years after Time-Warner.  Under Unitrin’s elaboration of the proportionality
test, a defensive tactic survives the intermediate standard of review if it is neither
coercive nor preclusive and falls within a range of reasonableness. For present purposes,
                                                                                                                                                  
26 Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp, 651 A. 2d 1361 (Del. 1995).
27 Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 (1990).
28 551 A.2d at 800.
13
the critical question is whether the defensive tactic is preclusive.  But the preliminary
question is preclusive of what?  Refusing to redeem a poison pill will always preclude a
tender offer.  It will not, however, necessarily preclude a proxy fight to replace the
target’s directors with nominees who can be expected to conclude, after careful and
informed deliberation, that the offer is in the shareholders’ best interests and thereafter
redeem the pill.  Does the presence of a poison pill allow a target company to force a
bidder to have the success of its offer determined by an election rather than a tender
offer?
Without confronting the issue directly, the Delaware Supreme Court appears to
have simply assumed that the availability of a proxy fight renders a poison pill non-
preclusive, thereby shifting the focus to the circumstances under which the proxy fight
would be conducted.  The court acknowledged that “[w]ithout the approval of target
boards, the danger of activating a poison pill renders it irrational for a bidder to pursue
stock acquisitions above the triggering level.”29  Thus, a poison pill is preclusive of a
tender offer.  But under Unitrin, refusal to redeem the pill is not preclusive under Unocal
unless a proxy fight is also precluded.  On remand, the Supreme Court in Unitrin directed
the Chancery Court to “determine whether Unitrin’s Repurchase Program would only
inhibit American General’s ability to wage a proxy fight and institute a merger or
whether it was, in fact, preclusive because American General’s success would either be
mathematically impossible or realistically unattainable.”30
Thus, Unitrin at least identifies the circumstance when Unocal allows a target to
block a tender offer by declining to “pull the pill” – if a proxy fight is not
                                                 
29 651 A.2d at 1381.
30 Id. at 1388-89.
14
“mathematically impossible” or “realistically unattainable.”  Because the poison pill has
become ubiquitous – every public company either has adopted a pill or can adopt one if a
hostile offer is made – the Delaware Supreme Court’s analysis reduces functionally to a
preference that control contests be resolved through an election, rather than a market: a
target can block a tender offer so long as a stymied bidder can press its case through a
proxy fight.31
My purpose here is not to criticize the court’s doctrinal analysis, although that
task commends itself.  For example, one certainly would have thought that prior doctrine
dictated a somewhat more rigorous limit on defensive action in response to a proxy fight
than that the action not render the proxy fight mathematically or realistically unattainable.
Rather, I will focus only on the wisdom of the court’s apparent conclusion however
opaquely reached: that proxy contests are preferable to tender offers as a means of
resolving a control contest.
V.  The Problems with a Preference for Elections
I see three serious problems with the Delaware Supreme Court’s preference for
elections.  The first poses a simple process concern: the need for transparency in setting
the rules by which important business transactions must be considered. The other two are
substantive.  First, markets are more efficient than elections at resolving control contests;
the court’s preference makes the process less effective.  Second, the court’s rule has had
the predictable effect of shifting defensive energy into proxy contests; the Unitrin
election preference thus serves to degrade the electoral process itself.
                                                 
31 To be sure, the court in Household International justified the pill in part because shareholders retained
access to the proxy mechanism, the court nonetheless reserved a review function under Unocal when the
15
A.  The Obligation to Provide an Explanation
The process problem is that the court in Unitrin provides neither explanation nor
justification for its preference for elections.  A court’s obligation to provide reasons for
its action is more than a matter of professional craft; explaining the chosen outcome at
least imposes the discipline of logic on the range of alternatives available to a court.  As
important, an explanation provides in equal measure not only a justification for the result
in a particular case, but also guidance for the future.  In Unitrin, the Delaware Supreme
Court confronted an issue that it had managed to duck for 10 years – can a target
company “just say no” by declining to pull the pill?  A common law court – and most
takeover law is common law and not statutory – has a professional obligation to clearly
articulate its grounds of decision.  Uncertainty may preserve a court’s flexibility, as some
commentators have suggested in defense of the studied ambiguity of important Delaware
Supreme Court opinions,32 but it comes at the expense of allowing parties to order their
affairs.  As a result, the court gets it precisely backwards: the point is to make things
easier for actors in the economy to go about their business, not to make it easier for
courts.
B.  Markets are More Efficient than Elections at Mediating the Transfer of
Control
The first substantive problem concerns the direct costs of preferring elections to
markets: the preference is not justified.  While this is not the time to work out the
                                                                                                                                                  
target company refused a redemption request by a bidder.
32 Charles Yablon, Poison Pills and Legal Uncertainty, 1989 Duke L.J. 54 (1989); Marcel Kahan.,
Paramount or Paradox: The Delaware Supreme Court’s Takeover Jurisprudence, 19 J.Corp. Law 583
(1994).
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argument more formally,33 I think it is straightforward to show that elections at best can
be the equivalent of markets in determining when it is efficient for control for a control
change to go forward, but that under more realistic circumstances, elections will be
significantly worse.34
The equivalency case involves making heroically simplifying assumptions of the
sort common in most economic models.  Assume with me that a bidder launches a tender
offer that target management believes is substantively coercive.  Further assume that
because target management declines to pull the pill, shareholders are barred from
accepting the tender offer unless the board of directors is replaced.  In this hypothetical,
however, we have an innovative election procedure.  The shareholders cast their ballots
for directors by checking a box on the letter of transmittal when they conditionally tender
their shares.  If the ballots are sufficient to replace the directors, then the pill is
automatically pulled and the bidder can take down the shares.35  Finally, assume that all
shareholders are perfectly informed about both the merits of the competing positions and
the detail of the target directors’ good faith belief that the market undervalues the
company’s stock.
                                                 
33 Alan Schwartz and I attempt to show formally the comparative inefficiency of elections in Ronald J.
Gilson & Alan Schwartz, Sales and Elections as Methods of Transferring Corporate Control (working
paper, May 2000).
34 For this purpose I will not rely on public choice problems with voting as applied to corporate law.
Jeffrey Gordon, Shareholder Initiative: A Social Choice and Game Theoretic Approach to Corporate Law,
60 U. Cin. L. Rev. 347 (1991).
35 This process is only one step off of reality.  While the Supreme Court in Mentor Graphics made clear
that the newly elected directors must exercise their independent business judgment in evaluating the
bidder’s offer, Quickturn Design Systems, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corporation, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del.S.Ct.
1999), it is predictable that a careful record will be crafted to support their decision to let the offer go
forward.  Thus, the simplified procedure in the text assumes away only the choreography.
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Under these quite restrictive assumptions – perfect information and an election
structure identical to the tender offer – the election is tautologically equivalent to a non-
coercive tender offer.
The equivalence disappears, however, once the simplifying assumptions are
released and some reality intrudes on the analysis.36  Most important, a proxy contest
invites manipulation on the part of the target company to influence the outcome of the
election.  The risk remains that, under the second Apple Bancorp decision,37 cooperation
among parties in connection with a proxy contest will serve itself to trigger a pill.
Further, target companies may succeed in manipulating the election by recourse to
techniques for strategically delaying the timing of the shareholders’ meeting through
notice provisions, director qualification requirements, and limits on the calling and timing
of special meetings.  Finally, there remains the issue of staggered boards.  For those
companies who have won the defensive lottery by having a staggered board in place
before institutional investors decided that, because of the interaction of staggered boards
with poison pills, they would not vote for them, or for those companies who went public
with a staggered board already in place,38 the election route requires a minimum of two
years to change control of the board.  While one may question whether independent
directors will continue the defense if the would-be bidder handily wins the first proxy
                                                 
36 These assumptions might not be so unrealistic if the Delaware Supreme Court had not in Stroud v. Grace,
606 A.2d 75 (1992) collapsed Blaisus’ requirement of a compelling justification for management
interference with the electoral process into Unocal for purposes of a proxy contest associated with a tender
offer.
37 Stahl v. Apple Bancorp., Fed. Sec. L.Rep. (CCH) ¶95,412 (Del.Ch. 1990).
38 See Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm Value? Antitakeover
Protection in IPOs, Working Paper, Jan. 2000 (45% of companies undertaking an IPO between 1993 and
1998 had staggered boards).  This paper is accessible through the Legal Scholarship Network at
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?ABSTRACT_ID=187348.
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fight39, even a small possibility of a two-year delay can be of enormous significance in
today’s quickly moving product markets.
Thus, once we get real, elections clearly appear a poor second to markets in
assessing the benefits of a contested control change.  Of course, this should come as no
surprise; the SEC directly confronted the issue of the comparative efficiency of elections
and markets at mediating control changes in crafting Rule 19c-4.  Then, it will be
recalled, the issue was whether an election could be used to shift control of a company by
means of a charter amendment creating two classes of voting common stock. Consistent
with the case for requiring those seeking control to buy it rather than campaign for it,40
the SEC adopted a rule that favored markets over elections.  As adopted in July, 1988,
Rule 19c-4 prohibited changing the voting rights of existing common stock by ballot, but
allowed new issuances of common stock with lesser voting rights than the outstanding
class of common stock. 41
Despite the comparative efficiency of markets compared to elections, the court
might have relied on the statute to justify its preference for elections.  The problem,
however, is that the statutory language itself provides no clear guidance.  As the debate
over the poison pill in Household International clearly demonstrates, statutory language
often does not command a particular result, but is consistent with either of the conflicting
                                                 
39 See Ronald J. Gilson, The Case Against Shark Repellant Amendments: Structural Limitations on the
Enabling Concept, 34 Stan. L.Rev. 775, 794 (1982)(Once the target company has lost the first proxy
fight,“an independent director has not reason to fight a fall-back action in the face of both inevitable defeat
and the ideology of majority rule.”).
40 The issue was posed in this fashion in Ronald J. Gilson, Dual Class Common Stock: The Relevance of
Substitutes, 73 Va. L. Rev. 807 (1987).
41 Rule 19c-4 was short-lived..  In The Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990), the
SEC was found to have exceeded its statutory authority to regulate stock exchanges by adopting a rule that
was largely concerned with corporate governance. Ultimately, the New York Stock Exchange, American
Stock Exchange, and NASDAQ voluntarily adopted a rule that parallels Rule 19c-4, although not before
those companies who most wanted to shift control through an election had already accomplished it and who
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results urged by both parties.  The statute, like a golem, requires an animating principle to
come alive.  In Household International, the principle was the Delaware Supreme Court’s
commitment to review the actual operation of the pill under Unocal when a takeover
arose.  But Unitrin’s effective abandonment of Unocal’s regulatory function brings us
back to the need for an animating justification: why should the court prefer elections to
markets?  And on this issue, Unitrin simply leaves us hanging.
C.  The Supreme Court’s Election Preference Serves to Degrade the Election
Process
The second substantive problem with preferring elections to markets in mediating
changes in control is indirect: the impact of the Supreme Court’s preference for elections
on the integrity of the electoral process itself.  The predictable result of Unitrin has been
a quickly escalating level of board-implemented barriers to contested elections.  And, to
be frank, judicial efforts to constrain this process have not been up to the task.
 The portion of the Chancery Court’s opinion in Mentor Graphics that concerned
the defensively adopted bylaw illustrates the problem.42  The bylaw, adopted by target
directors to buy time in the face of a proxy contest that they believed the company could
not win, authorized the directors to delay the holding of a shareholder called meeting for
90 to 100 days after it determined the validity of the initial request.  The Vice-Chancellor
concluded that the “the 90 to 100 day interval chosen by the target board, although it may
arguably approach the outer limit of reasonableness, struck a proper balance in this
specific case.”  It is not unfair to the Vice-Chancellor to note that there is no real
discussion of why 90 days is necessary.  And it is certainly to the Vice-Chancellor’s
                                                                                                                                                  
were grandfathered under the voluntary rule.  Jesse Choper, John C.Coffee, Jr. & Ronald J. Gilson, Cases
and Materials on Corporations 571 (5th ed. 2000).
42 Mentor Graphics Corporation v. Quickturn Design Systems, C.A. Nos. 16584 & 16588 (Del. Ch. 1998).
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credit that he was quite clearly aware of the risk that approving a 90 to 100 day delay
without an animating principle that might serve to cabin the opinion’s predictable
expansive drift, would encourage ever more extreme measures.  After all, the worst that
could happen to an overly aggressive target management is that the bylaw would be
struck down.
Recognizing the incentive in favor of aggressive defensive behavior, the Vice-
Chancellor explicitly warned that “attorneys who represent corporate boards would best
serve their clients well by counseling caution and restraint in this area, rather than
seeking continually to push the time-delay envelope outwards to test its fiduciary duty
limits.”43  But while the impulse to lecture counsel on their duties is both laudable and
continues the Chancery Court’s useful technique of instructing counsel through dicta,44
the simple fact is that the opinion – and the Delaware courts’ approach in this area –
operates to encourage attorneys to push the envelope precisely because there is no
principle guiding the outcome.  What factors would counsel against a delay of 90 days,
said by the court to be potentially unreasonable “in other circumstances”?  If, as the court
suggests, “it is impossible to draw a line that categorically separates mandatory delay
periods which have a basis in reason, from those that so manifestly burden or impede the
election process that they can be characterized as intended to entrench the incumbent
board,” then how can the ambiguity do other than encourage clients “continually to push
the time-delay envelope outwards…,”  precisely the behavior we have observed with the
poison pill.  Certainly, respected counsel’s assistance in the adoption of slow-hand and
dead-hand pills gives one little reason to anticipate professional self-control.
                                                 
43 Id.
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Nor should the onus be placed entirely on the Chancery Court.  The standard on
remand in Unitrin – that a tactic not render a proxy fight “mathematically impossible or
realistically unattainable” – itself invites extreme measures since the formulation implies
that the process can be drastically skewed in management’s favor so long as it is not
impossible for a bidder to win the proxy fight.
In the end, the absence of a guiding principle restricting director manipulation of
election contests is the greatest irony of all.  While the Delaware courts plainly recognize
that elections are all that legitimate directors’ power over assets that belong to others, the
shifting of control contests into the electoral process has served to degrade the electoral
process itself.  It is rather hard to imagine an electoral process that can both confer
legitimacy on the victor and still leave the incumbent very substantial discretion to
manipulate the process.  Debate over the timing of this year’s Peruvian presidential
election starkly illustrates the problem.
VI.  Is There a Way Out? The Shareholder Adopted Bylaw Debate
However trenchant, criticism is made constructive only by providing a solution to
the problem.  How can the Delaware Supreme Court ameliorate the electoral bias created
in Unitrin45 without simply reversing 15 years of common law development?46  I think
                                                                                                                                                  
44 See Gilson, William T. Allen, supra note 12, at 917-18; Edward Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does
Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. 109 (1997).
45 Vice-Chancellor Strine recently commented with refreshing candor that “Delaware’s doctrinal approach
[to defensive tactics] is premised on the assumption that the world can be viewed simultaneously wearing
three pairs of eye glasses with different prescriptions (Unocal, business judgment, and entire fairness.  It is
not apparent that this approach works any better in the law than it does in the filed of optics.”  In re Gaylord
Container Corporation Shareholders’ Litigation (Del.Ch. 2000)
46 Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del.S.Ct. 19994), suggests that
the current Delaware Supreme Court is oversensitive to admitting it had made a mistake.  In QVC the
Supreme Court rejected the formulation of the Revlon trigger it announced in Time-Warner in favor of the
“change in control” test originally proffered by the Chancery Court in Time-Warner (which the Supreme
Court had rejected in that case in order to base its decision on “different grounds).” 571 A. 2d at 1150.
When confronted by Paramount counsel’s claim in QVC that Paramount had complied with the standard the
Supreme Court announced in Time-Warner, the Court responded by stating that “[t]he Paramount
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such an avenue exists and, indeed, in the context of an issue that the Delaware courts will
certainly confront: the validity of shareholder-adopted bylaws to redeem poison pills.
Taken to its conclusion, my analysis calls into question not merely Time-Warner,
in which the Supreme Court lifted the Chancery Court’s more erosion-resistant allocation
of decision authority between directors and shareholders, but also Household
International, which provided the mechanism by which the erosion subsequently
occurred.  Fifteen years experience with Unocal teaches that shareholders ought to decide
whether to accept an offer made to them, subject to the board’s efforts to secure for them
a better alternative.  As the Chancery Court explained in Interco, the legitimacy of our
corporate law and, we now have seen, the legitimacy of the electoral process as well,
depends on the shareholders’ ultimate decision-making role.  With the benefit of
hindsight, the pill in Household International should have been struck down for the very
reason that it was expedient to management: the absence of shareholder approval.
But what do we do now?  I start with the widely shared view that the genius of
Delaware corporate law and of American corporate law generally is that it is for the most
part enabling – it gives the parties the freedom to choose their governance structure rather
than imposing an outcome upon them.  The Delaware courts’ sympathetic treatment of
the pill, understandably caught up in the frenzy of the 1980s, lost sight of that fact.  The
attraction of the pill to target management is that it can be imposed without shareholder
approval, and shareholders cannot remove it without incurring the cost, in resources and
opportunity, of replacing a board of directors that might in all other respects be doing an
                                                                                                                                                  
defendants have misread the holding of Time-Warner. … The Paramount defendants’ argument totally
ignores the phrase ‘without excluding other possibilities.’”  637 A. 2d at 48. Put differently, counsel should
have known that the Court had its fingers crossed in Time-Warner.  It would have been more
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excellent job.  That is hardly an enabling approach; as Chancellor Allen pointed out in
Blasius, directors are not Platonic guardians.47  Rather, it reflects the sense of the times,
incorrect to be sure but an understandable accommodation in that moment of perceived
crisis, that shareholders could not be trusted to vote for sensible defensive measures.
We are past that point now.  Institutional investors quite routinely approve
sensibly drafted pills, and even some not-so-sensibly drafted pills that are proposed by
trusted, well performing management.  In this calmer time, it would be appropriate to
return to an enabling approach that allowed shareholders to choose their governance
regime, including whether to have a poison pill.  But how to accomplish this without
entirely replanting a path now worn clear by 15 years’ experience?
Shareholder adopted bylaws are now working their way up the judicial process
toward a determination of their fit under Delaware law.  As I understand it, the standard
response among many thoughtful Delaware lawyers, especially after Mentor Graphics, is
that such bylaws violate § 141(a)’s grant of managerial authority to the board of
directors.48  However, § 141(a)’s grant of authority is qualified by the phrase “except as
otherwise permitted in this chapter or in the certificate of incorporation.”  Section 109(b)
– obviously in “this chapter” – authorizes shareholders to adopt bylaws containing “any
provision, not inconsistent with law or with the certificate of incorporation, relating to the
business of the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and the rights and powers of its
stockholders, directors, officers, or employees.”
                                                                                                                                                  
straightforward for the Court simply to acknowledge that it had changed its mind and was adopting the
Chancery Court’s formulation.
47 Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 663 (Del.Ch. 1988).
48 Professor Hamermesh surveys professional opinion on the validity of shareholder-adopted bylaws to
repeal a poison pill.  Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Corporate Democracy and Stockholder-Adopted By-Laws:
Taking Back the Street?, 73 Tulane L. Rev. 409 (1998).
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As my colleague Jeffrey Gordon has perceptively noted, the broad grant of
management authority to the directors in §141(a), referring to the “business and affairs of
the corporation,” juxtaposed with the equally broad grant of authority for shareholder-
adopted bylaws in §109(b), referring to “the business of the corporation [and] the conduct
of its affairs,” should call to mind the Delaware doctrine of “equal dignity” or
“independent legal significance.” 49  This doctrine, which lets corporate participants
choose among different statutory alternatives for dealing with precisely the same
functional activity, is the very embodiment of Delaware’s enabling approach.  The board
manages pursuant to §141(a); the shareholders adopt bylaws pursuant to § 109(b).  Under
the equal dignity doctrine, the fact that the two sections cover the same ground results not
in a conflict, but in alternative approaches to the same problem.
Allowing shareholders to redeem poison pills or replace them with less expansive
versions by means of a bylaw allows the Delaware Supreme Court to back off with grace
from the extreme position to which they were driven by the turmoil of the 1980s and the
failure of any other institution, most notably the United States Congress, to give the
governance of takeovers more than superficial attention.  In particular, shareholder-
adopted bylaws largely (but not entirely) returns to shareholders the decision making role
with respect to tender offers that Household International transferred to the board of
directors, and allows shareholders to reverse Time-Warner by reinstating only an Interco-
style constrained pill.
                                                 
49 Jeffrey Gordon, “Just Say Never?”  Poison Pills, Deadhand Pills, and Shareholder-Adopted Bylaws: An
Essay for Warren Buffet, 19 Cardozo L.Rev. 511 (1997).  The most familiar application of the equal
dignity doctrine in Delaware has been its deployment to defeat the defacto merger doctrine.  The statutory
conflict between functionally equivalent acquisition techniques only one of which accords target
shareholders appraisal rights, is ignored by according each technique independent legal significance; i.e.,
allowing the parties to the transaction to choose whether to accord appraisal rights.  See Hariton v. Arco
Elecs., Inc., 188 A.2d 123, 140 (Del. Ch. 1933); R. Gilson & B. Black, supra note 5, at 674-87.
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While the shareholder bylaw route still leaves the balance between shareholders
and management tipped toward management – absent Household International, it would
be better to require the directors to seek shareholder approval to impose a pill in the first
instance rather than requiring the shareholders to seek repeal because of our rules for who
bears the cost of proxy initiatives50 – it is a workable way out of an outcome that, because
it encourages managerial manipulation of the electoral process, genuinely degrades the
legitimacy of Delaware corporate law.
To be sure, one can undertake a more technical interpretive analysis concerning
how the conflicting language of Sections 109(b) and 141(a) might be rationalized. While
it can be argued that the language of § 109(b) was hardly intended for this function,
Household International itself provides the response.  Responding to the same objection
with respect to its broad reading of  §157, the Supreme Court quoted Unocal:
 [O]ur corporate law is not static.  It must grow and develop in response
to, indeed in anticipation of, evolving concepts and needs.  Merely because the
General Corporation law is silent, as to a specific matter does not mean that it is
prohibited.”51
Stretching § 157 correspondingly stretches § 109(b).
Professor Coffee takes the problem more seriously, providing a careful and quite
plausible exegesis of alternative approaches to cabin the breadth of shareholder initiative
under § 109(b), and thereby minimize the conflict with director authority under § 141(a),
while still allowing shareholders to repeal poison pills. 52  In contrast, Professor
                                                 
50 R. Gilson & B. Black, supra note 5, at 1337n28 (Speaking with respect to the same issue in connection
with a corporation opting out of a state antitakeover statute, “[i]f the statutes were structured to require a
charter amendment to opt in to the statute, management would still be able to use corporate funds to
propose the amendment and solicit votes in its favor, but shareholders would at least have the opportunity
to reject it.”).
51 493 A.2d at 1352 (quoting Unocal, 493 A.2d at 957.
52 John C. Coffee, Jr., The Bylaw Battlefield: Can Institutions Change the Outcome of Corporate Control
Contests?, 51 U. Miami L. Rev. 605 (1997).
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Hamermesh concludes after a lengthy analysis that traditional and non-traditional tools of
statutory interpretation, the public choice problems associated with shareholder voting,
and especially the difficulty of identifying of defining a “poison pill,” counsel in favor of
stopping Section 109(b) short of poison pill repeal.53
My goal here is not to resolve the scope of § 109(b) as a matter of technical
interpretation beyond expecting the Delaware Supreme Court to hew to their equal
dignity canon,54 in no small measure because I am enough of a realist to be skeptical both
of the power of technical arguments to drive as opposed to rationalize outcomes,55
especially in Delaware, and of a coherent explanation that distinguishes under Delaware
                                                 
53  Hamermesh, supra note 48.
54 The most direct argument is that the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Mentor Graphics invalidates
any incursion on the board of directors’ authority to manage the corporation.  See Dennis J. Block & Simon
C. Roosevelt, Further Implications of the Mentor Graphics and Fleming Decisions for Shareholder Bylaws,
7 Corporate Governance Advisor 18 (issue 2, March/April 1999).  Read more narrowly, and consistent with
an equal dignity approach, Mentor Graphics holds only that § 141 prevents a board of directors from acting
to limit the power of future boards of directors to manage the corporation. It does not extend to limitations
imposed by the shareholders under express statutory authority.  The Chancery Court’s comment in General
DataComm Industries, Inc. v. State of Wisconsin Investment Board, 1999 WL  66953 (Del. Ch. Feb. 1,
1999), suggests this narrower interpretation. Considering the validity of a shareholder adopted bylaw
prohibiting the board from repricing outstanding stock options without shareholder approval, the court
framed the issue nicely:
“It may be that [the company] is correct in stating that the Repricing Bylaw is
 obviously invalid under the teachings of [Mentor Graphics].  But the question
 of whether a shareholder-approved bylaw that can potentially be repealed at any
 time by the [company’s] board of directors exercising its business judgment,
is clearly invalid under the teaching of a case involving a board-approved
contractual rights plan precluding, by contract, a new majority from redeeming
 the rights under the plan until six months after election seems to me to be a
question worthy of careful consideration.”
Both Professor Coffee, supra note 52, and Professor Hamermesh, supra note 48, discuss possible
resolutions to the problem of recursive bylaw adoptions by shareholders and director action, first repealing
and then reinstating poison pills.  For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that even this circularity is
better than the present situation.  At least when shareholders are allowed to act, the board must overtly
overrule the shareholders.  As Professor Coffee has noted, this is costly to directors, presumably more so
than taking no action at all in response to precatory resolutions, as is the case now.   Coffee, supra note 52.
Even in a system of Burkean representation, there are repercussions when a representative’s judgment
differs from those of her constituents.
55 Karl Llewellyn makes the point emphatically in his classic illustration that for every canon of statutory
interpretation there is an equal and opposite canon.  Karl N. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition:
Deciding Appeals 521-35 (1960).
27
law when the conflict between statutory provisions must be respected – the equal dignity
move – and when the conflict is explained away through interpretation.  Nonetheless, two
rather practical points are worth making.  First, defining a poison pill presents at worst no
greater difficulty than defining a defensive action under Unocal, a task that has been
largely uncontroversial.  To paraphrase a response to a different interpretative problem,
the Delaware courts have known defensive tactics when they have seen them, and will
know a poison pill when they see one.56  Second, the interpretive problem is of no
grander scale than the Delaware Supreme Court’s assessment in Household International
of whether the broad language of Section 157 encompassed poison pills.  The outcome
requires a theory of the mechanisms that govern the shifting of corporate control, an
animating structural principle for the bones of the statute.57  Unocal was to provide the
theory that Household International lacked, but the lesson of Unocal’s first fifteen years
is that the Delaware Supreme Court’s march toward an unarticulated and unjustified
preference for elections over markets, however understandable in its original motivation,
has proven to be a failure.  The Chancery Court had the animating principle right in the
first place: the ultimate decision makers concerning a tender offer should be the
shareholders.  However realistic the threat of a tidal wave of junk bond financed, two-
tier, bust-up takeovers, assisted by unthoughtful shareholders, may have appeared to the
Delaware courts in 1985, we know now that it was a chimera.  Between bidder and target
                                                 
56 The line drawing problem may involve no more than identifying whether the power to block a tender
offer has been given to the board or to a third party.  If the former, the device is a poison pill; if the later, it
may raise Revlon problems but may not be a pill.
57 Gilson, A Structural Approach, supra note 13.  It is odd that Professor Hamermesh invokes public choice
problems associated with voting in order to limit the breadth of shareholder approved bylaws.  The result of
his argument is to petrify the Delaware Supreme Court’s shift of control contests from markets to elections
which, given his concerns about voting, he must recognize as an inefficient transfer.  So long as a court can
recognize a poison pill, so as to cut off the slippery slope that concerns him, Professor Hamermesh should
switch sides on this issue.
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now stand large sophisticated shareholders with carefully considered views of corporate
governance.  Shareholder initiated bylaws provide an imperfect, but realistic, way to turn
back the clock.
VII.  In the End, a Silver Lining
So far, I have been quite negative in my assessment of the fifteen-year Unocal
experiment.  However, no cloud is without a silver lining, and in this case the silver
lining is substantial even if accidental.
Given the decision to take on the task of distinguishing between good and bad
defensive tactics, the manner in which the Delaware courts have carried out that charge is
interesting.  A fair reading of the Supreme Court’s intermediate standard decisions,
buttressed by the Chancery Court’s and especially Chancellor Allen’s repeated dicta
about the critical role of independent directors in management buyouts, is that
independent directors are expected to be the controlling parties in a target company’s
conduct of its defense.  Only when the directors appear to have abdicated their role to
management – think of Van Gorkum,58 Macmillan,59 and QVC – will the court
intervene.60
As I have made clear to this point, I think this is the wrong approach; evaluating
target board conduct misses the question of who should be making the decision in the
first place.  But, it seems to me, there has been at least one beneficial, if unintended,
consequence of this focus on director performance.  The role the Delaware Supreme
Court has assigned independent directors in connection with takeovers is quite different
                                                 
58 Smith v. Van Gorkim, 488 A.2d 858 (Del.S.Ct 1985).
59 Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del.S.Ct. 1989).
60 Rock, supra note 44;  Kahan, supra note 32.
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than the role directors assigned to themselves prior to the turbulent 1980’s.61  At least in
the takeover arena, independent directors, the Delaware courts have stated pointedly, are
not merely advisers to management, who have no stake in whether their advice is
followed.  In the takeover arena, independent directors must be the real decision-makers
and courts will expect them to play a central role in conducting the target’s response to a
hostile or competing offer.
That change in assigned role is quite significant, especially because I believe it
cannot be and has not been tightly cabined to the takeover arena.  Once directors
internalize the norm that they are the central decision-makers with respect to the most
critical issue in the target company’s existence, it is hard to imagine that the generals will
return to the barracks in less pressing circumstances.  Thus, I am convinced that the high
profile board firings of CEO’s in a series of large corporations such as Good Year, Allied
Signal, Tenneco, General Motors, American Express and Westinghouse, reflected the
expansion into other areas of the new role for independent directors that the Delaware
Supreme Court put forward in its takeover jurisprudence.
This is no small improvement, and I suppose one might argue that the systemic
benefits of a newly invigorated board of directors may outweigh the costs of a
dysfunctional takeover regime; given that the proper corporate governance response to
problems depends on the nature of the problem, the tradeoff hinges on what conditions
the company is actually facing.62  However, as my analysis of the shareholder bylaw
phenomenon suggests, we are not doomed to suffer the tradeoff.  Directors are now
                                                 
61 See, e.g., Myles Mace, Directors: Myth and Reality (1971).
62 See Randall Morck, Andrei Shliefer & Robert Vishny, Alternative Mechanisms for Corporate Control,
79 Am. Econ. Rev. 842 (1989)(Board action responds to poor performance compared to competitors, but
third party intervention is necessary to respond to industry wide problems.).
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energized.  We need no longer continue paying the price of takeover rules that, however
well meaning and driven by circumstances, we can now recognize are far less than
optimal.
